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Discretionary, and Protective Trusts in North Carolina and the
Federal Tax Lien*
I. INTRODUCTION
Your children have never been good with money. When they were
young and you gave them their weekly allowance, they spent all of their
money on candy at the corner store within hours. As your children
grew older, they accepted every offer of free credit, opened accounts at
every retailer, and indulged themselves at every opportunity to squan-
der what little money they had. Although you tried to teach them how
to manage their money, their generation does not seem to understand
the value of a dollar. One of your children is even behind on his taxes
and has Uncle Sam breathing down his neck.
Despite their shortcomings in terms of financial responsibility,
you desire to leave them an inheritance. You do not, however, want
your life savings squandered in the same fashion as your children's
childhood allowance. After consulting with your family attorney, you
learn of several options to transfer your wealth to your children. The
first is simply letting your assets pass via intestacy, an option certainly
not palatable to a person who wants to exert some control over how
their assets are distributed. The second option, according to your
attorney, is by will; while you can designate who will receive your
money, there isn't much you can do to influence what is done with it
once it leaves your estate. Finally, your attorney informs you that in
North Carolina there are several types of trusts that offer the type of
protection and control you are looking for. Spendthrift, discretionary,
and support trusts offer you the ability to direct how and when (if at
all) payments are made and insulate everything but trust distributions
from the reach of creditors.' Your attorney tells you that when prop-
erly configured, under a recent modification to North Carolina law, the
trustee of a discretionary or spendthrift trust may even make payments
directly to the beneficiary of such a trust in spite of a creditor's liens.2
However, the added benefits of the newly changed law are both mis-
* The author would like to thank Professor James B. McLaughlin for his help
developing this comment.
1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-501 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-502 (2006);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-504 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-508 (2006).
2. See § 36C-5-504; § 36C-5-501.
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leading and inconsistent with the common law, especially as applied to
discretionary trusts.
3
Prior to January, 2006, North Carolina trust law was atypical of
most jurisdictions around the country.4 Unlike other states, North
Carolina did not recognize spendthrift trusts and offered fairly stan-
dard protections against creditors of the beneficiaries of support, dis-
cretionary, and protective trusts.' However, as North Carolina adopts
more of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), longstanding common law
principles backed up by sound public policy are being swept under the
carpet. While each change alone may not be radical, hasty adoption of
these UTC provisions alters basic aspects of the common law without
even so much as a murmur of explanation.
The most puzzling changes came in the form of sections 36C-5-
501 and 36C-5-502 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Given that
the vast majority of states recognize spendthrift trusts,' it should come
as no surprise that North Carolina has come to follow these states and
recognize such trusts. Surprising, however, are the accompanying
changes made to the provisions protecting beneficiaries of spendthrift,
discretionary, and protective trusts from the reach of creditors. Essen-
tially usurping the common law, trustees of the aforementioned trusts
may make distributions directly to beneficiaries regardless of whether
a lien or attachment exists.7 Furthermore, by giving similar, if not
identical, protections to the beneficiaries of spendthrift, discretionary,
and protective trusts, the legislature is slowly eroding the distinction
between these various devices.
There is strong public policy in favor of protecting a beneficiary of
a spendthrift, discretionary, or support trust from the claims of credi-
tors.8 These trusts are created by settlors with the express purpose of
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1959); compare Alan Newman,
Article, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An
Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REv. 771, 807 (2002) ("Without a
spendthrift provision, creditors of the beneficiary may attach 'present or future
distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiary' that must then be paid to the
creditor.") (citation omitted), with § 36C-5-501, and § 36C-5-504.
4. Before section 36C-5-502 of the North Carolina General Statutes became
effective in January, 2006, North Carolina was in the extreme minority of states that
did not recognize spendthrift trusts in any form. See C. R. McCorkle, Annotation,
Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 34 A.L.R.2d 1335 (1954 & Supp. 2007) (discussing the
law of spendthrift trusts in each state).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-504(2) (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-501(b)
(2006).
8. See, e.g., In re Morgan's Estate, 72 A. 498, 499 (Pa. 1909).
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providing an inheritance to those who simply cannot be trusted to
manage money on their own.9 Creditors are the primary threat to the
continued vitality of a trust settled for the benefit of a profligate benefi-
ciary. In recognition of the interest trust settlors have in controlling
what becomes of their estates after their death and to effectuate their
intent, state legislatures as well as courts have created several tools to
restrain both the voluntary and involuntary alienation of these trust
interests. 10
However, the recent changes discussed above threaten to cause
confusion among settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries. Moreover, it is
"contrary to sound public policy to permit a person to have the abso-
lute and uncontrolled ownership of property for his own purposes,
and to be able at the same time to keep it from his creditors."11 In
effect, the recent changes adopted by the North Carolina legislature
allow the trustee of a discretionary, spendthrift, or protective trust to
ignore the claims of creditors completely and continue to make dis-
bursements to the beneficiaries of such trusts. Furthermore, due to
the seemingly indomitable power of a federal tax lien, in certain situa-
tions federal law arguably allows a tax lien to attach to payments
before they reach a beneficiary (as per the common law), while other
creditors can only reach the interest once received by the beneficiary.
This could effectively give priority to a federal tax lien, rather than
adhering to the traditional common law approach, which entitles the
creditor that files a lien first to priority over liens filed later. As the
Supreme Court noted, "Federal tax liens do not automatically have pri-
ority over all other liens.' 2
This Comment seeks to discuss the impact of the revisions made
to North Carolina trust law effective January, 2006 (discussed above)
in the context of their incongruity with the common law and the poten-
tial for favoritism toward federal tax liens over prior liens attached by
state creditors (including liens for state taxes). In order to rectify the
problems created by the revisions, North Carolina should either clarify
the impact of these changes so as not to leave settlors, trustees, or ben-
eficiaries with unrealistic expectations or revise the code to fill in the
gaps created by the revisions.
9. See generally 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 23 (2002).
10. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 222 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 1984).
11. Ullman v. Cameron, 78 N.E. 1074, 1076 (N.Y. 1906) (quoting Hallett v.
Thompson, 5 Paige Ch. 581, 584 (N.Y. Ch. 1836)).
12. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 449 (1993).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRUSTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
A trust is nothing more than a complex arrangement to make a
gift. 13 While a gift is typically a two-party relationship, a trust involves
a third party known as the trustee.14 The trustee holds legal title to the
property to be held in trust, while the beneficiary holds an equitable
interest that varies in scope depending on the type of trust created by
the settlor (the creator of the trust). 15 Trusts began in feudal England
primarily as a means to circumvent the rules of primogeniture and
dower-laws that required freehold land to pass by descent-and other
archaic forms of taxation. 16 These early English trusts were known by
the term "use," describing the relationship between the trustees and
beneficiaries where "a landowner conveyed his land to his friends (the
trustees) 'for the use' of the landowner's children."'17 Creating a "use"
allowed a landowner to ensure that only his family received his prop-
erty at his death, rather than having the property fall to the king or
some other feudal lord. 18 The creation of uses was difficult due to the
various formalities that had to be observed; thus, remedies were often
limited unless the use was created in complete accord with the formali-
ties. 19 These uses or trusts were employed by married women to pre-
vent their husbands from inheriting by them, by those attempting to
skirt the mortmain laws (designed to compel forfeiture of land con-
veyed to religious organizations to the lord), and also as a method to
avoid the claims of creditors.2 °
The use system received a major overhaul in 1535 when the Stat-
ute of Uses was passed by the English Parliament.2' The Statute of
Uses effectively ended the "passive" use, where a trustee simply held
the land for the use of the beneficiary.22 As explained by one
commentator:
13. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 632 (1995).
14. Id.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 128 (1959).
16. Langbein, supra note 13, at 632.
17. Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts For People with Disabilities: The
Development of a Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 100
(2000).
18. Id.
19. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 3.
20. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 102. See generally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
10, at § 4.
21. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 102.
22. Id.
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The object of the Statute was to abolish uses, and this it proposed to do
by wiping out the estate of the feoffee to uses, and giving to the cestui
que use the legal estate .... Instead of leaving it to the feoffee to uses to
transfer the legal title to the cestui que use when the latter required it,
the Statute transferred such interest immediately on the creation of the
use.
2 3
Instead, uses were only valid if the trustee had duties outside of simply
holding the land (for example, caring for the land or collecting rents
and profits).24 In essence, the Statute of Uses forced trusts to have
some sort of purpose beyond simply skirting the law; a trustee had to
have specific duties toward the beneficiary other than holding prop-
erty for a period of time.25
The move from employing trusts as a vehicle to dodge unfavorable
feudal laws (the passive use) to the development of more intricate trust
arrangements with functions beyond landholding represented more
than just a change in the law. Trusts developed into a method of main-
taining wealth and transferring it to successive generations.26
Trusts came to America with its earliest settlers and were
employed to protect a wide variety of assets for individuals as well as
corporations.27 One commentator noted that while the development
of trusts in early America was a slow process, "towards the end of the
eighteenth century, when trusts came into more common use in
America, the English system had been well developed, and was adopted
in substantial entirety by the American colonial and early state chan-
cellors. '' 28 While American innovation in the area of trust law was late
to develop, it is responsible for the introduction of the professional
trustee.2 9 The tendency to have corporate or professional trustees
"produces a situation very different from that which used to be the
typical situation in England, where a man induced two or three of his
friends ... to take upon themselves the onerous and thankless task of
administering his estate for the benefit of his family. '30 Thus, while
America took the trust (along with the rest of the common law) from
England, the development of trust law in the United States has seen
decidedly American innovations. As each state began to develop its
23. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 4.
24. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 102.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 103.
27. Id.
28. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 222.
29. 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1.8, at 28
(4th ed. 1987).
30. Id.
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own unique trust law, separation between the states became readily
apparent.3
1
III. SPENDTHRIFT, PROTECTIVE, AND DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS IN
NORTH CAROLINA
A. Spendthrift Trusts
Like all of the original colonies, North Carolina trust law is based
on the English common law.32 However, the trust law of each state is
unique and has developed along its own path.33 Because the focus of
this Comment relates to spendthrift, protective, and discretionary
trusts, in the interest of economy, the history of these devices in North
Carolina law will be examined alone, rather than including a more gen-
eral history of North Carolina trust law.
Spendthrift trusts in North Carolina are a product of the legisla-
ture.34 North Carolina courts have historically been unwilling to cre-
ate spendthrift trusts via case law.35 In fact, before spendthrift trusts
were created by the legislature, no such trusts were recognized in
North Carolina.36 One later decision noted:
North Carolina has valiantly withstood efforts in its courts to have
valid spendthrift trusts born out of case law. Traditional notions of
public policy and fair play have remained predominant. The view of
the North Carolina courts is that whatever interests a debtor has in
property of any sort may be reached by his creditors, in law or equity,
according to the nature of the property.37
The spendthrift trust recognized statutorily in North Carolina had
its beginnings in the latter part of the nineteenth century.3 8 The origi-
nal North Carolina statute limited the amount of income the benefici-
31. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 7 (discussing the development of
trust law in the United States).
32. Scott, supra note 29, at 28.
33. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 7.
34. There seem to be no cases in North Carolina where spendthrift trusts were
recognized by judicial fiat.
35. Spendthrift trusts did arise out of case law in other American jurisdictions. The
genesis of spendthrift trusts can be traced to dicta in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716
(1875), where Justice Miller laid the foundation for the validity of the modern
spendthrift trust. See also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 222.
36. Id. (citing Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480 (1837); Mebane v. Mebane, 39 N.C.
131 (1845); McKimmon v. Rogers, 56 N.C. 200 (1857); Pace v. Pace, 73 N.C. 119
(1875)).
37. Swink v. Swink, 169 S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
38. Gilbert T. Stephenson, The North Carolina Spendthrift Trust Statute, 31 N.C. L.
REv. 175 (1952).
[Vol. 29:737742
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ary could receive from the trust each year.39 As a further restriction,
the income could only be used for certain purposes-for the support
and maintenance of the beneficiary.40 In addition, the settlor of the
trust could only create a spendthrift trust under the statute for the
benefit of "children, grandchildren, and other relation of the creator of
the trust."41 One criticism of this early statute was that it was unclear
as to the scope of what relatives fell under the "other relation" clause.42
North Carolina's early "spendthrift" statute allowed the creation
of spendthrift trusts in name only. This stemmed to some degree from
the negative image engendered by spendthrift trusts as a vehicle to
allow the rich to provide for their layabout children in a manner that
would allow them to escape even the lowest level of responsibility-
primarily to creditors.43 Furthermore, former section 41-9 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, which authorized limited "spend-
thrift" trusts under North Carolina law, was repealed in 1979 by for-
mer section 36A-115-a statute that did not offer a spendthrift
provision at all.44 Needless to say, North Carolina's early law gov-
erning the implementation of spendthrift trusts is dotted with suspi-
cion and extreme caution.45
Although the history of spendthrift provisions under North Caro-
lina law would suggest that change is uncommon, a revision to the
North Carolina version of the UTC abolished former section 36A-115
and replaced it with a new statute.46 The new statute not only recog-
nizes spendthrift provisions but also makes significant, and perplex-
ing, changes to other types of trusts, most notably discretionary trusts.
The text of the new statute, section 36C-5-501, "Rights of beneficiary's
creditor or assignee," is as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the court may
authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the benefici-
ary's interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for
the benefit of the beneficiary or other means. The court may limit the
award to that relief as is appropriate under the circumstances.
39. Id. at 176.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id.
43. See JAMES B. MCLAUGHLIN & RICHARD T. BOWSER, 2 WIGGINS WILLS &
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN N.C. § 23:11, at 19 (rev. 4th ed. 2005 & Supp. 2007).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1872), repealed by Act of March 22, 1979, ch. 180, §2,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 126; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-115 repealed by Act of July 15, 2005,
ch. 192, §1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 345.
45. See generally Stephenson, supra note 38.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-501 (2006).
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(b) This section shall not apply and a trustee shall have no liability to
any creditor of a beneficiary for any distributions made to or for the
benefit of the beneficiary, to the extent that a beneficiary's interest:
(1) Is subject to a spendthrift provision;
(2) Is a discretionary trust interest as defined in G.S. 36C-5-
504(a)(2); or
(3) Is a protective trust interest as described in G.S. 36C-5-508. 4 7
As noted above, the new statute officially recognizes spendthrift
trusts in North Carolina. While some may argue that the early, nine-
teenth century spendthrift statute already recognized such trusts, its
complex requirements and restrictive application offered nowhere near
the same level of protection as the new statute that became effective
January 1, 2006. The new statute provides sound protection from
most creditors, with the sole statutory exception to such provisions
being where "a beneficiary's child who has a judgment or court order
against the beneficiary for support or maintenance may obtain from a
court an order attaching present or future distributions to or for the
benefit of the beneficiary. '48 Although the former section 36A-115
allowed for the creation of protective trusts, which were the closest ana-
log to the spendthrift provision found in the new statute, the new stat-
ute fully recognizes the prototypical spendthrift trust.
49
Spendthrift provisions were not created to protect an irresponsible
beneficiary; instead, such trusts arose out of "consideration for the
right of the donor to control his or her bounty and dispose of the
donor's property in any manner the donor sees fit."' 50 In essence,
spendthrift trusts were created to protect the settlor's right to distribute
his property without having to fear that a careless or immature benefi-
ciary could squander his fortune by simply handing it over to some
creditor.5 ' Allowing a settlor to create a trust that thwarts the claims of
a beneficiary's creditor is justified on the grounds that, "[a] settlor is
under no legal or moral obligation to the creditors of the beneficiary of
a spendthrift trust, and the creation of such a trust takes nothing from
a creditor of the beneficiary to which the creditor previously had the
right to look for payment. '5 2 Thus, the spendthrift trust is a mecha-
nism to allow a settlor to retain some dead hand control over her for-
47. Id.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-503(b) (2006).
49. McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 43, at 19.
50. 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 23 (2002).
51. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the
Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
52. 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 23 (2002).
[Vol. 29:737
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tune and prevent a less responsible beneficiary from wasting his
inheritance.
5 3
A spendthrift provision must meet the following criteria defined
by section 36C-5-502 in order to be valid under North Carolina law:
(a) A spendthrift provision is valid only if it restrains both voluntary
and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest.
(b) A term of a trust providing that the interest of a beneficiary is held
subject to a "spendthrift trust", or words of similar import, is sufficient
to restrain both voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's
interest.
(c) A beneficiary may not transfer an interest in a trust in violation of a
valid spendthrift provision and, except as otherwise provided in this
Article, a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may not reach the
interest or a distribution by the trustee before its receipt by the
beneficiary.
54
The key protection against creditors in subsection (c) is also a part
of section 36C-5-501 and essentially shields the trustee of a spend-
thrift trust (as well as trustees of discretionary and protective trusts)
from being compelled to make distributions directly to creditors.55 A
creditor may only attempt to attach to a distribution from a spend-
thrift trust once the beneficiary has received the funds.5 6 While it may
seem that a spendthrift trust is close to a discretionary trust in the type
of protection it offers, traditionally in order for a spendthrift trust to be
considered as such, "the trustee [cannot have] discretion as to the dis-
tribution of the income except in the event of an attempted alienation
by the beneficiary or application to payment of debts. 5 7 Thus, a bene-
ficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust is considerably greater than the
mere expectation interest held by the beneficiary of a discretionary
trust.
53. Id. ("Public policy considerations behind enforcing spendthrift trust provisions
include the right of donors to dispose of their property as they wish, the public interest
in protecting spendthrift beneficiaries from personal pauperism, so that they do not
become public burdens, and the responsibility of creditors to make themselves aware
of their debtors' spendthrift trust protections.").
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-502 (2006).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-501 (2006).
56. § 36C-5-502(c).
57. 97 CJ.S. Wills § 1431 (2001), (citing In re Bucklin's Estate, 51 N.W.2d 412
(Iowa 1952)).
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B. Discretionary Trusts
Discretionary trusts offer the same type of strong protection from
creditors58 but limit a beneficiary's interest even further while allowing
the trustee to retain more control.59 North Carolina defines discretion-
ary trusts by statute, although it is mostly a codification of the com-
mon law.60  Section 36C-5-504(a)(2) explains the function of a
discretionary trust:
"Discretionary trust interest" means an interest in a trust that is subject
to the trustee's discretion, whether or not the discretion is expressed in
the form of a standard of distribution. A discretionary trust interest
shall include an interest in any one or any combination of the
following:
a. A trust in which the amount to be received by the beneficiary,
including whether or not the beneficiary, or a class of benefi-
ciaries, is to receive anything at all, is within the discretion of the
trustee.
b. A trust in which the trustee has no duty to pay or distribute
any particular amount to the beneficiary, but has only a duty to
pay or distribute to the beneficiary, or apply on behalf of the
beneficiary, those sums that the trustee, in the trustee's discre-
tion, determines are appropriate for the support, education, or
maintenance of the beneficiary. 6 1
As explained above, the most significant difference between
spendthrift and discretionary trusts is that a trustee under a discre-
tionary trust is under absolutely no obligation to make disbursements
to the beneficiary.62 Moreover, subsection (c) of the statute provides
that, "a creditor of a beneficiary may not compel a distribution from a
trust in which the beneficiary has a discretionary trust interest even if
the trustee has abused the trustee's discretion. ' 63 When read along
with subsection (d), it is clear that only the beneficiary may compel
distribution based on a trustee's abuse of discretion.64 Thus, the draft-
ers of the new statutory scheme unquestionably meant to secure abso-
lute protection for the beneficiaries of spendthrift, support, and
discretionary trusts from their creditors.
58. § 36C-5-501
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1959).
60. McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 43, at 22.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-504(a)(2) (2006).
62. § 36C-5-504(a)(2)(b).
63. § 36C-5-504(c).
64. § 36C-5-504(d).
746 [Vol. 29:737
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This represents a marked change from the former section 36A-
115, which did not include any provision with such stringent protec-
tion.65 It has been suggested that:
It is now clear beyond any doubt that a trustee may make a distribu-
tion to the beneficiary even after being served with an attachment or
an attempt to otherwise levy on the beneficiary's interest by a creditor.
It is interesting, perhaps even fascinating, to read the North Carolina
Comment to this section in that they state that this is not a change in
North Carolina law.66
While both the common law and former section 36A-115 of the
North Carolina General Statutes provided that a trustee could not be
compelled to make distributions to the creditors of a beneficiary of a
discretionary trust,67 it seems that under the new statutory scheme a
creditor cannot divert distributions made to the beneficiary.68 In other
words, a creditor cannot intercept the payments once the trustee has
exercised her discretion. It has been noted that this represents a shift
in the law and that under the former section 36A-1 15, "[aifter the exer-
cise of the discretion, which by necessity occurs before the actual dis-
tribution itself, the creditor may seize the property awarded to the
beneficiary while it is still in the possession of the trustee. '"69 If it is
the case that the new statute alters a creditor's right to intercept pay-
ments made to a beneficiary after the trustee has exercised his discre-
tion, then North Carolina has significantly altered, and strengthened,
the protections it offers to the beneficiaries of discretionary trusts.7"
C. Protective Trusts
The final aspect of the new section 36C-5-501 that will be dis-
cussed here relates to protective trusts. North Carolina defines protec-
tive trusts as follows:
65. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-115 (1979), repealed by Act of July 15, 2005, ch.
192, §1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 345.
66. McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 43, at 21.
67. See § 36A-115 (" . . . the amount to be received by the beneficiary, including
whether or not the beneficiary is to receive anything at all, is within the discretion of the
trustee.") (emphasis added); Hutchens v. Stout, 339 S.E.2d 103, 106 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986) ("Under a true discretionary trust, the trustee may withhold the trust income
and principal altogether from the beneficiary and the beneficiary, as well as the
creditors and assignees of the beneficiary, cannot compel the trustee to pay over any
part of the trust funds.").
68. McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 43, at 21.
69. Id. at 22.
70. Id.
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Except with respect to an interest retained by the settlor, a "protective
trust interest" means an interest in a trust in which the terms of the
trust provide that the interest terminates or becomes discretionary if:
(1) The beneficiary alienates or attempts to alienate that interest;
or
(2) Any creditor attempts to reach the beneficiary's interest by
attachment, levy, or otherwise; or
(3) The beneficiary becomes insolvent or bankrupt. 7 1
A protective trust offers many of the same protections from credi-
tors afforded by spendthrift and discretionary trusts, with the primary
difference being that a protective trust terminates or becomes discre-
tionary (the latter being one of the "minor" modifications discussed by
the North Carolina Comment) when one of the three criteria listed
above are met.72 Protective trusts offer settlors the power to have the
added assurance that if the beneficiary or one of his creditors attempts
to reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust, the trust will either ter-
minate or become discretionary.7 3 The primary modification to the
statute is the addition of the "or becomes discretionary 7 4 language.75
What difference this new language will have on the effect of the statute
remains to be seen, but it seems that a settlor could couple the stronger
creditor protections of the new statute, along with the new provision
allowing for protective trusts to become discretionary, to keep the trust
intact after one of the three stated events but allow the trustee to
refrain from making disbursements until the proverbial storm has
passed.
D. Making Sense of the Changes
After reviewing the recent changes in the North Carolina version
of the UTC dealing with spendthrift, discretionary, and protective
trusts, it would be hard to argue that a significant shift in the law has
not taken place. While the former section 36A-1 15 was simply a codi-
fication of the common law, it seems that the new statute alters the
common law in several significant ways. 76 First, it recognizes full
spendthrift trusts for the first time under North Carolina law.7 7 This
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-508 (2006).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 43, at 23.
76. Id. at 19.
77. While former N. C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (repealed 1979) did purport to recognize
"spendthrift" trusts, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-502 (2006), is the first instance of
spendthrift trusts, as they are commonly known, under North Carolina law.
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represents a major shift in terms of public policy.78 Second, the new
statute expands the protection from creditors offered by discretionary
trusts by providing that the creditors of a beneficiary of a discretionary
trust may not attach a lien on payments made by the trustee to the
beneficiary until after the beneficiary has received the funds. 79 The
common law provided for a window where once a trustee had exer-
cised his discretion and decided to make a payment to the beneficiary,
the creditor could intercept the payment before its receipt by the bene-
ficiary.8 o Section 36C-5-501 changes this common law rule and per-
mits trustees to make distributions to beneficiaries even in the face of
liens or attachments.8 Third, and least significant, is the change
made to protective trusts, giving the settlor the option of creating a
trust that either terminates or becomes discretionary if one of the three
criteria listed in section 36C-5-508 are met.8 2
IV. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS
To a casual observer, quarreling about these changes may seem
like splitting hairs; but they represent considerable changes to North
Carolina law that could cause unexpected consequences. The new law
seems to create more of a burden on creditors attempting to collect
from the beneficiary of one of these trusts. However, one of the unin-
tended consequences of the new statute could be its impact on federal
income tax liens. The federal tax lien statute provides that:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount,
addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may
accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person.83
It has been held that in determining what constitutes "property" or
"rights to property" the Court looks:
[Ilnitially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the
property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to deter-
mine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'prop-
78. See generally Stephenson, supra note 38 (discussing spendthrift trusts being
against public policy in North Carolina).
79. See McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 43, at 21.
80. See, e.g., United States v. O'Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1994);
Calloway v. Smith, 186 S.W.2d 642 (Ky. 1945).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-501 (2006).
82. § 36C-5-508.
83. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2000).
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erty' or 'rights to property' within the compass of the federal tax lien
legislation.
8 4
While it may come as no surprise that what composes a taxpayer's
"property" or "rights to property" is initially determined by state law,
and federal law dictates whether the interest may be reached via a tax
lien,15 the true problem created by the changes made to the North Car-
olina version of the UTC are far deeper. The United States Supreme
Court has not ruled on whether the expectation interest held by the
beneficiary of a discretionary trust is enough of an interest to allow a
federal tax lien to attach or whether a trustee's duties are defined by
state or federal law. The closest analog seems to be the Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Craft,8 6 where the Court held that a taxpayer's
expectation interest in a tenancy by the entireties property was signifi-
cant enough to allow a tax lien to attach. 7 However, at least one court
has held that there is no authority suggesting that a trustee must notify
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) when making a disbursement.88
When viewed in light of section 36C-5-501 of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes, it is possible to interpret the responsibility of the trustee
(under North Carolina law) to be solely to the beneficiary and create
no obligation to honor the liens of, or communicate with, any
creditor.8 9
Whether a trustee has an obligation under federal law to divert
payments to the IRS (or even to notify the IRS of disbursements), or
whether he may follow the new North Carolina law and make pay-
ments without respect to a creditor's lien or attachment, is a matter
that has not been confronted by any court. It would seem that, at least
against a federal tax lien, a trustee cannot ignore the IRS and make a
disbursement to the beneficiary. 90 However, if this is the case, it is
certainly misleading to settlors (who expect that the protections
afforded by section 36C-5-501 will apply against any creditor), trustees
(who expect that the statute will guide them as to their obligations to
84. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999); accord United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274 (2002).
85. Id.
86. 535 U.S. 274.
87. Id. at 288.
88. In re Wilson, 140 B.R. 400, 407 n.6 (Bankr. D. Tex. 1992).
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-501(b) (2006) ("[A] trustee shall have no liability
to any creditor of a beneficiary for any distributions made to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary."). Given the fact that the trustee under this section has no liability to
creditors whatsoever, it is logical to conclude that a trustee also has no duty to
communicate with such creditors concerning potential trust distributions.
90. But cf. In re Wilson, 140 B.R. at 407 n.6.
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creditors), and beneficiaries (who rely on the protections of the statute
to preserve discretionary payments made from the trust). This type of
inconsistency also favors the federal government as a creditor and
forces private creditors and the state to look at a beneficiary's other
assets. While a federal tax lien is certainly one of the most powerful
encumbrances recognized by law, it does not always have priority
before other liens; "Federal tax liens do not automatically have priority
over all other liens. Absent provision to the contrary, priority for pur-
poses of federal law is governed by the common-law principle that 'the
first in time is the first in right."' 9 1 When coupled with the fact that
state laws barring creditors from reaching trust distributions until
receipt by the beneficiary are "not determinative of the reach of the
Federal Tax Lien," it is apparent that North Carolina has placed federal
tax liens in a special category (albeit unintentionally).92
Moreover, the decision in Craft calls into question whether the
Supreme Court now views the corpus of a discretionary trust as fair
game for a tax lien. While courts have found that a beneficiary's inter-
est to income in a spendthrift trust is enough of a property interest to
allow a lien to attach, these same courts have been reluctant to allow a
lien to attach to the corpus of such trusts. 93 In light of the fact that a
beneficiary under a discretionary trust has only an expectation that he
will receive some benefit, the Craft decision at least calls into question
whether future decisions may seek to attach to more than just the
expectation interest and seek to burden the corpus as well.
A. United States v. Craft: A Bundle of Problems
Justice O'Connor's opinion in United States v. Craft94 represents
one of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions concerning
property law in recent history. The Craft Court held that a husband's
interest in a tenancy by the entireties property was enough of an inter-
est in property for a tax lien to attach-entitling the IRS to the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the home should the wife die before the husband
leaving him the sole owner.95 The Craft's, a couple from Michigan,
91. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 449 (1993); cf. 26 U.S.C. § 6323
(2000) (codifying the common law principle).
92. United States v. Cohn, 855 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D. Conn. 1994) (citing Olson v.
Olson, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2955 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992); Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509 (U.S. 1960)). See also IRS v. Orr, 180 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1999).
93. See, e.g., Bank One Ohio Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F.3d 173 (6th Cir.
1996); Cohn, 855 F.Supp. 572; In re Lyons, 148 B.R. 88 (Bankr.D.D.C. 1992).
94. 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
95. Id. at 287.
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purchased a home as tenants by the entirety in 1972.96 As tenants by
the entirety, the Craft's owned their home as a husband and wife
entity, rather than individually or as co-tenants. 97 The crucial differ-
ence between tenancy by the entirety and other forms of property own-
ership is that neither spouse may individually alienate or encumber
the property without the explicit authorization of the other spouse.98
Similarly, the tenancy may not be severed without the agreement of
both husband and wife, divorce, or the death of one of the parties.99
In 1988, due to a failure to file timely tax returns, Don Craft was
assessed $482,446 in tax liabilities by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). 10 After Don Craft failed to pay the assessed tax liabilities, the
IRS attached a tax lien to any interest in property belonging to Mr.
Craft under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code.101 The Craft's
then attempted to transfer their interest in the property to Sandra Craft
for a sum of one dollar, ending the tenancy by the entirety. 10 2 When
Sandra Craft tried to sell the property several years later, the lien was
revealed during a title search. 10 3 The IRS allowed the sale but would
not release its lien on the property without "the stipulation that half of
the net proceeds be held in escrow pending determination of the Gov-
ernment's interest in the property. "104
Sandra Craft then brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed
proceeds in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan.10 5 The trial court found in favor of the IRS. Both parties
then appealed, and the Sixth Circuit held that "the tax lien did not
attach to the property because under Michigan state law, the husband
had no separate interest in property held as a tenant by the
entirety."'1 6 Following the decision of the Sixth Circuit, the case was
remanded to the trial court. On remand, the court found that the Don
Craft's use of monies not exempt from the reach of creditors to pay the
mortgage on the entireties property was a fraudulent act under state
law and entitled the IRS to one half of the proceeds from the sale of the
96. Craft v. United States, 233 F.3d 358, 361 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, United States
v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
97. 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 46 (1991).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Craft, 535 U.S. at 276.
101. Id. at 276-278.
102. Id. at 277.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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entireties property. 0 7 Both parties appealed again and the decision
was affirmed the district court.108 The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari. 0 9
The issue, as framed by Justice O'Connor-in her majority opinion,
is "[wihether the interests of respondent's husband in the property he
held as a tenant by the entirety constitutes 'property and rights to
property' for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute . . . is ulti-
mately a question of federal law."" 0 Traditionally, an interest in an
entireties property has been considered merely an expectation interest,
with possession only possible upon divorce, death, or by mutual agree-
ment.11 ' The Court, however, focused on the definition of what consti-
tutes a "right to property" under the federal tax lien statute. Justice
O'Connor's opinion spends considerable time inventorying the various
"sticks" in Mr. Craft's "bundle" to determine if his interest in the entire-
ties property is significant enough for a tax lien to attach." 2 Justice
O'Connor points out, correctly, that "[n]either spouse was considered
to own any individual interest in the estate; rather, it belonged to the
couple."' 13 However, even in light of this well recognized principle, the
opinion continues to examine whether Mr. Craft individually has
enough of an interest in the property to justify allowing a tax lien to
attach. 1 4 Thus, the Court seems to ignore the very principles it lays
down as a foundation for collecting the sticks in Mr. Craft's bundle.
The Court defines Mr. Craft's rights in the entireties property as
including:
[T]he right to use the property, the right to exclude third parties from
it, the right to a share of income produced from it, the right of survivor-
ship, the right to become a tenant in common with equal shares upon
divorce, the right to sell the property with the respondent's consent
and to receive half the proceeds from such a sale, the right to place an
encumbrance on the property with the respondent's consent, and the
right to block respondent from selling or encumbering the property
unilaterally. 1 5
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 278 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6321).
111. 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 46 (1991).
112. Craft, 535 U.S. at 278.
113. Id. at 281.
114. Id. at 282.
115. Id.
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Utilizing the "bundle of sticks" analogy, O'Connor examines each
"right" individually to determine whether it is hardy enough to allow a
tax lien to attach.1 1
6
When assembling Mr. Craft's bundle, the majority looks to past
decisions to pick and choose instances where tax liens have attached
to various types of property interests. 1 7 The first type of interest the
Court examined is the "right to use the property, to receive income
produced by it, and to exclude others from it.""' Similarly, the Court
also considered the right to use the property along with the right to
"alienate (or otherwise encumber) the property with the consent of
respondent, his wife." ' 1 9 The Court then expands on its ruling in
United States v. Rodgersl2 ° and analogized a spouse's interest in a ten-
ancy by the entireties property to property claimed under a state
homestead exemption.' 2 ' Justice O'Connor explained, that
"[e]xcluding property from a federal tax lien simply because the tax-
payer does not have the power to unilaterally alienate it would, moreo-
ver, exempt a rather large amount of what is commonly thought of as
property."'12 2 The Court did not consider, however, that the very pur-
pose of creating property that cannot be unilaterally alienated in the
context of a tenancy by the entirety is to prevent creditors of one
spouse from affecting the interest of the other spouse in the prop-
erty. 2 3 Needless to say, the Court ignored the idea that a tenancy by
the entirety is owned by a husband/wife entity and not individually by
either spouse.
Similarly, the Court latched onto the concept of the husband's
right of survivorship as being a property interest resilient enough to
allow a tax lien to attach. 124 The Court widened its holding in Drye v.
United States' 25 where the Court suggested that an expectation interest
may not be reached by a tax lien prior to the time that it ripens.' 26 The
Court did not explicitly characterize the right of survivorship held by
116. Id.
117. Id. at 283
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
121. Craft, 535 U.S. at 284.
122. Id.
123. Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1767, 1788
(1984) ("[Olne of the primary functions of tenancy by the entirety [is the] protection
of a surviving spouse from her deceased mate's creditors.").
124. Craft, 535 U.S. at 285.
125. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
126. Id. at 60.
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Mr. Craft as being significant enough to allow the tax lien to attach,
but the Court did look at the right of survivorship as yet another
"stick" held by Mr. Craft.12 7
Most surprisingly, in concluding that Mr. Craft had an adequate
property interest in the tenants by the entireties property, the Court
supported its decision by noting that "if the conclusion were other-
wise, the entireties property would belong to no one for the purposes
of [section] 6321. " 128 Thus, it seems that the Court's justification for
allowing the federal tax lien to attach was that if the government were
not allowed to place a lien against Mr. Craft's interest, it would not be
able to attach any lien at all. The circular nature of this argument
underscores how astonishing the decision in Craft is when viewed in
light of the reasons behind permitting couples to own property as
tenants by the entirety. A tenancy by the entirety is a legal fiction spe-
cifically designed to allow spouses to own property as a husband wife
entity.129 This provides protections from creditors, 130 allows the mari-
tal home to be quickly and painlessly transferred to the surviving
spouse upon the death of one of the tenants, 131 and does not allow
either spouse to unilaterally alienate the property. 132 In this manner,
tenancies by the entireties are in spirit very similar to spendthrift, dis-
cretionary, and protective trusts. If the Court hinged its argument on
the principle that "well, somebody must own it," then the beneficiaries
of discretionary trusts might as well tuck their tails and run. As one
commentator noted, the Craft decision "extend[ed] the line of cases
where property and rights to property were not defined by state-law
legal fictions to those situations where a taxpayer never possessed the
property under state law."'133
127. Craft, 535 U.S. at 285.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Combs v. Combs, 160 S.E.2d 308, 311 (N.C. 1968) ("This tenancy by
the entirety takes its origin from the common law when husband and wife were
regarded as one person, and a conveyance to them by name was a conveyance in law to
but one person.").
130. See, e.g., Foy v. Foy, 336 S.E.2d 707, 709 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
property owned as tenants by the entirety is not subject to levy and sale under
execution of a judgment against one spouse).
131. See, e.g., Estate of Nelson ex rel. Brewer v. Nelson, 633 S.E.2d 124, 127 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2006)
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (2006).
133. Wade M. Fisher, Note, The Internal Revenue Service Collects from an Innocent
Spouse in United States v. Craft: Could Business Associates Be Next?, 18 AKRON TAxJ. 77,
112 (2003).
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After all, neither the trustee13 4 nor beneficiary 135 of a discretion-
ary trust "owns" the corpus of the trust. While this in and of itself is
not an analog to a tenancy by the entirety, it demonstrates how a bene-
ficiary with a mere expectation interest in income from a trust is not
all that different from a spouse (like Mr. Craft) who only has an expec-
tation interest in a tenancy by the entirety. Granted, while the Court in
Craft attaches great significance to the "sticks" held in Mr. Craft's bun-
dle, 136 it is hard to apply that analogy to the type of interest enjoyed by
a beneficiary of a discretionary trust. However, Craft exposes the ten-
sion that exists between the government's interest in collecting federal
taxes and individual states' interests in allowing settlors to maintain
some dead hand control while at the same time shielding beneficiaries
of certain trusts from creditors. After Craft, it is unclear precisely what
a trustee's duties are in terms of making discretionary payments to
beneficiaries of discretionary trusts under section 36C-5-501 and sec-
tion 36C-5-504(a)(2). 137 Furthermore, even if Craft only stands for the
proposition that a federal tax lien may attach to an expectation interest
(and that as with spendthrift trusts if a payment is made via that inter-
est the government may intercept the disbursement), then the decision
raises the question of whether a tax lien levied by the State of North
Carolina prior to a federal lien would be powerless in light of section
36C-5-504(a)(2).
B. The Expectations of the Settlor, Trustee, Beneficiary, and Creditors:
Public Policy Tugging in Different Directions
Perhaps the most significant impact of the changes to the North
Carolina version of the UTC is impact on the public policy considera-
tions that give the rationale for having strong creditor protection. One
134. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 16.
135. In re Marriage ofJones, 812 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 1991) (holding that the corpus of
a discretionary trust is not "separate property" for purposes of marital dissolution
proceeding because beneficiary has only an expectation in income from the corpus of
the trust).
136. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002).
137. It seems that at least as far as spendthrift trusts are concerned, unless a trustee
is vested with full discretion, the government may attach a lien successfully to a
beneficiary's interest in such trusts and intercept payment before it reaches the
beneficiary. See United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 449 (1993). It is well
established law that a beneficiary under a discretionary trust has the right to force
payment where there is an abuse of discretion on the part of the trustee. See, e.g,,
Woodard v. Mordecai, 67 S.E.2d 639, 644 (N.C. 1951). Thus, the right of a beneficiary
to compel payment if a trustee abuses discretion is at least equal, if not more, than the
right to survivorship that was held by Mr. Craft.
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of the revised statutes provides that "a trustee shall have no liability to
any creditor of a beneficiary for any distributions made to or for the
benefit of the beneficiary" if the trust is a spendthrift, discretionary, or
protective trust.138 As discussed above, this marks a distinct shift in
the common law. 1 39 Under the common law approach either a trustee
with full discretion or a trustee with partial discretion had to honor the
liens of creditors once the trustee exercised discretion and decided to
make a payment.' 40 In other words, once "the day of payment arrives,
the lien of the execution attaches."'' This common law rule repre-
sents a better balance between the rights of creditors and the expecta-
tions of settlors and beneficiaries. Furthermore, it provides the trustee
with clear guidance because all liens will be treated equally rather than
permitting federal tax liens to sneak in under the door.
Furthermore, by allowing a trustee to make payments directly to a
beneficiary without being beholden to any liens, the new statute seems
to carve out an unintentional exemption whereby the federal govern-
ment may attach a tax lien even if a state tax lien was levied prior to
that by the federal government. 142 This is of course a result of the
awesome and seemingly invincible nature of the federal tax lien; never-
theless, one wonders why the legislature would permit the federal gov-
ernment to swoop in and intercept the payments made by a trustee
under such trusts while allowing the dust to gather on equally valid
state tax liens. The common law rule clearly supported the notion that
even under a discretionary trust the trustee would have to honor
attachments and liens he was aware of and divert payments to those
creditors. 143 Courts would of course take into consideration whether
the trust was designed for the care, support, or maintenance of the
beneficiary and adjust the trustee's obligation to creditors accord-
ingly.' 4 4 By altering the common law and providing that a trustee is
not liable at all to any creditor, North Carolina now allows benefi-
ciaries of spendthrift, discretionary, or support trusts to enjoy a steady
stream of income from such trusts and remain comfortable in the
notion that regardless of what obligations they have to creditors, that
income is exempt and protected from their claims. This step is firmly
against longstanding public policy, case law, and statutory law in
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-501(b) (2006).
139. See supra section II(B).
140. See Hamilton v. Drogo, 150 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1926).
141. Id.
142. See supra section IV(A).
143. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2003).
144. See id.
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North Carolina. 14 5 Although it is certainly in the province of legisla-
ture to make such changes to the law, the reasons behind North Caro-
lina's uneasiness towards such trusts is well grounded.' 4 6
Furthermore, other states have found room for various exceptions to
spendthrift provisions based on the nature of the creditor. 147 Finally,
as to protective and discretionary trusts, the protection from creditors
arose not because of the fact that discretionary or protective trusts as
such offered protections from creditors, but it resulted because of the
quality of the interest a beneficiary had in such trusts.' 48 This princi-
ple was how the former section 36A-115 provided its protection-the
interest in the income and the corpus of the trust was inalienable.' 49
The beneficiary could not alienate his interest, but once the interest
ripened, a creditor could attach to the matured interest.'i °
In the constant surge to adopt uniform statutes, it is possible for a
state to lose sight of the strong justifications behind its own unique
rules. For decades, North Carolina resisted joining the herd of states
allowing spendthrift trusts and enhancing protection from creditors.
North Carolina has ignored the strong public policy against the recog-
nition of such trusts and allowing for such strong protection from cred-
itors. Beyond confusing the expectations of settlors, trustees,
beneficiaries, and creditors, North Carolina has thrown out well
defined rules based on sound public policy in favor of a uniform rule
that does not fit North Carolina tradition.
V. CONCLUSION
The changes made to the common law by section 36C-5-501, sec-
tion 36C-5-502, section 36C-5-504, and section 36C-5-508 of the
North Carolina General Statutes reflect a lack of faith in the well devel-
oped public policy and common law principles that have developed
through careful thought and legal analysis over several decades. The
changes adopted by the legislature will lead to confusion as to the
extent of the protection against creditors afforded to the beneficiaries
of discretionary, spendthrift, and protective trusts, as well create a pref-
erence in favor federal tax liens where state tax liens would have been
145. See generally Stephenson, supra note 38.
146. See, e.g., Swink v. Swink, 169 S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
147. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 224.
148. See, e.g., Morrow v. Apple, 26 F.2d 543 (D.C. 1928).
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-115 (1979), repealed by Act ofJuly 15, 2005, ch. 192, §1,
2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 345.
150. This seems to be implied by former section 36A-115. See also BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 228.
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on more level footing before. Returning to the example given at the
beginning of this Comment, the family attorney would be correct in
the assertions he made to the would-be settlor: North Carolina offers
strong protection against creditors. However, these protections are
subject to vulnerability created by the possibility that a federal tax lien
could nevertheless attach to income interests that are otherwise well
protected. Public policy considerations and state tax lien preference
issues discussed above are serious problems and could easily arise.
Under the old statutory scheme, all liens were on equal footing. A
creditor with a valid lien at least had some chance of recovering
through attachment to trust payments. While the law is designed to
effectuate the intent of the settlor of such trusts as much as possible,
the law must also consider the rights of creditors-both state and
private.
By unintentionally carving out an exception for the federal gov-
ernment's tax lien, the new statutory scheme lacks both the clarity and
purpose of its predecessor. This Comment does not mean to suggest
that the old scheme should be readopted, but it does argue that by
adopting uniform code provisions while asserting that the law has not
been changed is certainly not a practice that should be maintained.
One possible solution could be to draft a state tax lien statute with
language substantially similar to the federal statute, but this remedy
may not alleviate all of the issues created by section 36C-5-501. The
North Carolina legislature should consider the potential implications
of decisions like Craft that represent the near invulnerability of a fed-
eral tax lien and adjust the North Carolina version of the UTC to
reflect recognition of the fact that the creditor protections professed in
the statute may not be effective against such liens. Moreover, the right
of a trustee to be free from liability to the creditors of beneficiaries
should not mean that once the trustee has exercised discretion a credi-
tor may not attach to these payments. Doing so ignores that creditors
have some right to recover debts they are owed and stands against the
long standing public policy of North Carolina. There are benefits to
uniformity, but states should not ignore the unique aspects of their
law that recognize long standing public policy decisions grounded in
reason.
Philip Z. Brown
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